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SYMPOSIUM VERFASSUNGS- UND VÖLKERRECHT IM SPANNUNGSVERHÄLTNIS
At a crossroads: Russia 
and the ECHR in the 
aftermath of Markin
As part of Verfassungsblog’s topical focus on the prevailing 
tensions between international and national constitutional 
law, we go east and take a look at Russia and its unsteady 
relationship with the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) – particularly the lately arisen tensions between the 
Russian Constitutional Court (CCR) and Strasbourg in the 
wake of the ECtHR’s decision in the Markin case. First, and 
in a more general manner, we briefly review the theories 
conceptualizing the relationship between domestic and 
international law, which traditionally go by the names of 
monism and dualism. In doing so, we do not miss the point 
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that, as national constitutional practice in a variety of 
member states of the ECHR shows, conceptual clarity in 
terms of commitment to one or the other grand theory is 
often blurred, if not contradicted (I.). Clearly, Russia is no 
exception (II.). The Markin case marks a turning point in the 
relationship between the CCR and the ECtHR as Strasbourg, 
for the first time, overruled a decision of the CCR, which 
spurred a heated constitutional debate. The repercussions 
are yet to be seen (III.)
I. Blurred lines: The relative irrelevance of systemic 
commitment
In principle, legal scholarship has produced two grand 
theories in order to capture the relationship between 
international and domestic law: monism and dualism. 
Monism holds that international and domestic law form a 
holistic legal order. The law of the international community, 
however distinguishable from the laws of states by its 
specific patterns and procedures of emergence, modes of 
application and addressees, shares with the latter a single 
Grundnorm (Kelsen) or rule of recognition (Hart). As Kelsen 
contended, monism may be conceptualized either with the 
primacy of international over domestic law or vice versa, 
whereas the decision which option to choose is primarily 
political and escapes the world of (pure) legal theory. In the 
monist universe, conflicts between norms of different 
descent concern their legal validity, i.e. their specific 
existence as legal norms. According to the monist view, a 
rule of international law need not be incorporated into the 
domestic legal system to become legally relevant, i.e. binding 
upon its institutions and subjects. Dualism, on the other 
hand, purports that the international legal system is 
normatively distinct from the realm of domestic law. The 
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jurigenesis (Cover) of each system’s rules can be traced back 
along different pedigrees with incommensurable vanishing 
points. In its most radical formulation the two legal orders 
are to be perceived as two circles which may at best touch, 
but never intersect or overlap (Triepel). Radical dualism 
therefore negates the possibility of real conflicts between 
international and domestic norms. To render legally relevant 
claims within the national legal order, a rule of international 
law must be incorporated by a domestic legal act.
To be sure, when it comes to the relationship between the 
ECHR and the national legal order (namely, if perceived from 
an internal point of view of a particular national legal order), 
the dichotomy of monism and dualism is not the whole 
story. On the conceptual level, in strict observance of 
monism with the primacy of international law, a rule of 
international law trumps national law. From this vantage 
point, the ECHR overrides domestic rules without being 
incorporated into the national legal order. Once again, from 
the internal point of view, legal ‘reality’ is less clear-cut. 
Even resolutely monist countries could allow for lacunae 
owing to their internal concept of separation of powers, e.g. 
where (constitutional) courts lack jurisdiction over 
legislative acts. In such cases, the ECHR, even ‘within’ a 
monist system does not take immediate effect tout court. By 
the same token, dualism generally exacerbates contingency. 
The dualist countries, where the ECHR has to be 
incorporated in order to take legal effect, vary widely as to 
the rank they attribute to the Convention within their 
hierarchy of norms. By and large, the ECHR as any other 
international agreement internally shares the rank of its 
incorporating act. Where the Convention is incorporated by 
a legislative act, any new act of the legislature may change or 
derogate it pursuant to the principle of lex posterior derogat 
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legi priori. On a constitutional level this is the case in Austria 
after the Convention was given constitutional status in 1964. 
In Norway the ECHR was incorporated through ordinary 
statute. By means of Sect. 3 of the Norwegian Human Rights 
Act of 1999 it, however, takes “precedence over any other 
legislative provisions” in case of conflict. In Germany the 
status of the Convention was gradually heightened in 
recognition of its function and to avoid the problem of lex 
posterior by adjudicative fiat. These observations lead two 
commentators to the conclusion that “there is no necessary 
causal linkage between ex ante monism or dualism, on the 
one hand, and the reception of the ECHR on the 
other.” (Keller/Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights, 2008).
II. Russia: A case in point
Another striking example for the relative irrelevance of ex 
ante systemic monism is Russia. Art. 15 (4) of the Russian 
Constitution provides that the commonly recognized 
principles and norms of international law as well as 
international treaties of the Russian Federation are without 
further ado a “component part” of the Russian legal system. 
With the advent of a conflict between an international treaty 
of the Russian Federation and domestic law “the rules of the 
international treaty apply”. Yet, despite being formally 
monist, the reception of the ECHR in Russia is somewhat 
reminiscent of the proverbial “Marry in haste, repent at 
leisure”. Even before the Russia joined the Convention in 
1998, the CCR has been referring to the Convention and 
decisions of the ECtHR when analysing international 
standards of human rights protection.
A telling example of the initial spur is the Maslov case. The 
CCR altered the scope of the concept of the defendant 
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within the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR (Sect. 1, 
Art. 47, and Sect. 2, Art. 51) in accordance with the ECtHR 
case law. Referencing cases such as Quaranta and 
Ymbrioscia, Russian judges stressed the obligation of law 
enforcement to enable detained persons to access defence 
counsel in the first hours of police questioning, despite 
neither Russian criminal procedural law nor the Russian 
Constitution containing such an obligation. The message 
seemed pretty straightforward: we need to abide by the 
Convention when interpreting national laws and our own 
young Constitution. The argument in support of compliance 
is two-fold: on the one hand we may learn something 
(argument for the liberal audience in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg), on the other hand we can justify politically 
unpleasant decisions by pointing to the obligations and 
hardships put on us by that “foreign” European legal 
document (an argument rather convincing among the 
patriotic populace).
III. Allegiance and its discontents: Markin
After the honey moon period was over, things “got 
complicated”. The typified cause for the sudden mood swing 
was Konstantin Markin. Mr Markin was a Russian military 
service contractor who, following his divorce, desired to 
take care of his three children, one an infant at the time, for 
the duration of three years. To that end, he wanted to take 
advantage of the statutory parental leave for military 
servants. He applied shortly after the birth of his third child, 
but his request was denied on the grounds that Russian law 
solely grants female military personnel this benefit. In 2009, 
the CCR considered the case for the first time and found no 
violations of the Russian Constitution (Case №187-О-О). The 
court justified the evident gender discrimination with the 
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“limited participation of women in military service” and the 
“special social role of women associated with motherhood”.
In October 2010 the ECtHR issued its judgment (Markin v. 
Russia), followed by the Grand Chamber ruling of March 
2012. The Court criticized the CCR’s reasoning as 
“unconvincing” and pointed to “gender prejudices” in the 
decision. Furthermore, the ECtHR suggested that the 
Russian government was to amend its domestic law, which 
was found in breach of the Convention. Furious reactions 
from the CCR followed, its President Valeri Zorkin raised hue 
and cry: the decision showed a great lack of respect for 
Russia’s sovereignty and its legislature. Although the ECtHR’s 
Grand Chamber ruling had softened the original rhetoric, 
the conflict remained.
In 2013, Mr Markin petitioned the reopening of procedures 
in his case as a consequence of the ECtHR’s ruling. The 
regional Court in St. Petersburg called on the CCR for 
reconciliation in light of the contradicting judgments by the 
CCR and the ECtHR. The CCR ruled that district courts must 
in any event reopen proceedings in connection with an 
ECHR judgment. If, however, the court is not capable to 
enforce a decision without, at the same time, disregarding 
provisions of domestic law in the form of a binding 
interpretation of the Constitution rendered by the CCR, it 
must request the CCR to assess the constitutionality of such 
provisions. In other words, the CCR treats the conflict as a 
constitutional issue and (in quite dualist fashion) co-opts the 
authority to solve it – without imposing any general rules for 
the handling of the conflict.
Regarding the other, doctrinally more intriguing question on 
the supremacy over human rights interpretation, we’re still 
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left in the dark. The CCR ruled that “if . . . challenged legal 
provisions are found to be consistent with the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court . . . within the limits of its 
competence will determine possible constitutional means of 
implementation of the judgment of the [ECHR].” This most 
likely is to be taken as an ad hoc case-by-case approach 
similar to what the Courts in Germany and the UK proffer.
William E. Pomeranz, Deputy Director of the Kennan 
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and a key observer of 
the region, recently described the CCR and the ECtHR as 
uneasy partners and added that within its relationship the 
“inherent tension will not go away any time soon, especially 
in light of Russia’s poor human rights record.“ Russia needs 
the ECHR because its legal tradition lacks a credible human 
rights record and the Convention’s standards serve as a 
suitable yet demanding benchmark for the upcoming cases 
concerning sex-based discrimination and anti-protest 
legislation. The ECHR on the other hands needs Russia not 
only as the biggest country within the Council of Europe and 
because of spectacular cases such as YUKOS and Navalny. 
The ECtHR’s human rights jurisprudence gains more 
credibility as long as Russia is willing to implement ECtHR 
judgements. To this effect, dialogue, which “has to date 
prevailed over confrontation in Russia’s interactions with the 
ECtHR“ (Pomeranz) must continue.
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